Esta ley enmienda la Regla 51 de las Reglas de Procedimiento Criminal de 1963 para establecer un término para la diligencia de las órdenes de arresto. El término será el mismo que el de la prescripción del delito imputado, calculado desde la fecha de emisión de la orden. Para delitos sin término de prescripción o con un término menor a cinco años, el término para la diligencia será de cinco años. Se establecen factores para que un juez pueda aceptar una orden diligenciada fuera del término.
(Approved September 3, 2003)
To amend Rule 51 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1963, to establish a term for the service processing of arrest warrants.
Article II, Section 7, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sets forth that no person shall be deprived of their freedom without due process of law. Moreover, Section 11 of Article II of the Constitution sets forth that all persons accused of committing a crime are entitled to a speedy trial. These Constitutional imperatives are the basis of our penal system. The concept of "speedy trial" takes effect when a defendant is arrested or bound to reply to an accusation or information and a warrant of arrest has been issued for such purposes. In other words, this protection is activated when a procedural mechanism begins, which may end with a conviction, whose legal effect is to compel the defendant to answer for the commission of the offense of which the same has been accused. See, Pueblo v. Valdés Medina, 2001 T.S.P.R. 167; Pueblo v. Miró González, 133 D.P.R. 813, 821 (1993).
Based on the concept of a "speedy trial," Rule 51 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1963 sets forth that "...[t]he officer executing a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the court which issued the warrant or before any available magistrate, ..." In view of this, the United States Supreme Court has resolved that the time
between the issuing of the warrant of arrest and its service processing are included in the right to a speedy trial in criminal procedures protected by the Constitution. See, U.S. v. Mc Donald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982) and U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
At present, our procedural code of laws does not have a fixed term for the pertinent official to serve the arrest warrant, which has caused that in many instances the service processing has been delayed excessively without just cause. The effects of these delays have brought about that many cases have been dismissed on the grounds of the doctrine of "state of defenselessness," based mainly upon the right to a speedy trial and due process of law. Said doctrine was discussed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in the case of Pueblo v. Guardiola, 130 D.P.R. 585, page 594, where it was established that "... due process of law requires that all persons accused of committing a crime shall be arrested within a reasonable term starting from the moment in which the information is filed and the arrest is ordered. Thus, prompt due notice is fostered, allowing the accused to take the necessary measures for an adequate defense."
Based on the hermeneutics of the Supreme Court, this Act sets forth that the term for service processing of an arrest warrant shall be the same as the statute of limitations of the charged crime, calculated from the date of issue of the arrest warrant. This term, pursuant to the precedents in Pueblo $v$. Guardiola, supra, is based upon the sound logic that it would exceed the limits of what is reasonable if a term longer than the term fixed by law as the statute of limitations for criminal action were to elapse from the date of issue of the arrest warrant. Ibid, page 595. This term is used merely as a measure of reasonability for the service processing of an arrest warrant, for it is understood that there are other crimes that entail longer statutes of
limitation, and others that do not prescribe at all. For this type of crimes, the term of five years for the service processing of an arrest warrant apply. In view of the above, a distinction must be made between the concepts of the statute of limitations and the term for the service processing of an arrest warrant, to avoid confusion at the time for the application and construction of the law.
The reason for the statute of limitations is to achieve that the government informs the accused of the intention to process him/her and of the nature of the charges with sufficient time in advance. See, Pueblo v. Oliveras Frías, 118 D.P.R. 285, page 291 (1987). It is in the phases of the commission of the crime, the investigation, and the issuing of the arrest warrant that the term of prescription is calculated. See, Article 79 of the Penal Code. The service processing of the arrest warrant is entirely different, since the warrant is already issued by the court within the term of prescription, if any, as product of the evidence gathered in the investigation. Furthermore, it is in this period that the right to a speedy trial begins to rule. U.S. v. Mac Donald, supra.
On the other hand, the statute of limitations of crimes is not a right recognized by our constitutional code of laws, but rather a purely statutory privilege of legislative origin. See Pueblo v. Martínez, 144 D.P.R. 631 (1997) and Pueblo v. Vallone, 133 D.P.R. 427 (1993). Regarding the service processing of an arrest warrant, due process of law requires the arrest of any accused person within a reasonable term starting at the time in which the information is filed and the apprehension is ordered. See, Pueblo $v$. Guardiola, supra, page 594. In our constitutional law, due process of law guaranteed by our Constitution protects both those accused of crimes with
statutes of limitation and those accused of crimes without statutes of limitation.
This Act promotes that the agencies in charge of criminal justice serve arrest warrants in a timely and responsible manner for the purpose of making possible the processing of those who are guilty of crimes. Due process of law and the right to a speedy trial are also protected, avoiding the placement of the accused in a state of defenselessness, which is prohibited by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Section 1.- Rule 51 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is hereby amended to read as follows: "Rule 51.- Warrant of Arrest after the Filing of the Charges If the facts alleged in the charges constitute an offense, and the accused has not been arrested for said offense prior to the filing of the information, the court shall issue the appropriate warrant for his arrest. The officer executing a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the court which issued the warrant or before any available magistrate, in order to admit the defendant to bail.
The term for service processing of an arrest warrant \shall be the same as the statute of limitations of the crime charged, calculated from the date of issue of the arrest warrant. For cases that do not have a statute of limitations greater than five (5) years, or that do not have a statute of limitations at all, the term for the service processing of an arrest warrant shall be five (5) years calculated from the date of issue of the arrest warrant.
Under extraordinary circumstances, the judge may accept an arrest warrant that is served out of the established term as valid. For such purposes, the judge shall consider among others, the following factors: (1) Official procedures toward arresting the accused. (2) Whether the accused knows of the arrest warrant issued against him/her. (3) Whether the accused has escaped or hidden. (4) The availability of the accused for the execution of an effective service processing. (5) Whether the address or whereabouts of the accused are known or should have been known. (6) Whether the address of the accused has changed. (7) Whether the accused has fled from the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. (8) Mobility of the accused within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."
Section 2.- This Act shall take effect immediately after its approval.
I hereby certify to the Secretary of State that the following Act No. 246 (H.B. 2222) of the $5^{ ext {th }}$ Session of the $14^{ ext {th }}$ Legislature of Puerto Rico:
AN ACT to amend Rule 51 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1963, to establish a term for the service processing of arrest warrants, has been translated from Spanish to English and that the English version is correct.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today $27^{ ext {th }}$ of October of 2004.
Elba Rosa Rodríguez-Fuentes Director